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THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION IN 
THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN THE 
SUDAN 
LEILANI F. BATTISTE' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While many in the world have been focused on such tragedies as Hurri-
cane Katrina in the United States or the 150,000 people that were killed 
in the tsunami that occurred in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, un-
fortunately another humanitarian crisis has continued to unfold since the 
beginning of 2003. In Sudan's western Darfur region, a massive cam-
paign of ethnic violence has claimed the lives of over 70,000 civilians, 
with another 1.85 million internally displaced or fleeing to neighboring 
Chad, since February 2003. 1 
The humanitarian crisis in Darfur presents one of the greatest challenges 
to the international community since the coordinated massacre of over 
800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994. The mass murder of national, ethnic 
and tribal groups at the hands of both the Sudanese Government and the 
pro-Arab, government-backed militias, known as the janjaweed, 2 is 
deemed responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of black Sudanese 
in the region. 
* LL.M. Candidate GGU (2006). 
I. u.N. News Center, (Jan. 27, 2005) <www.un.org>. 
2. Originally referred to the nomadic Arab bandits who rode on horses and camels, enriching 
themselves by stealing livestock and attacking black Africans. "Jaan" means "evil" in Arabic, and 
"jawad' means "horse", roughly translating "janjaweed' as "evil horseman." Although there are 
numerous variations on the spelling of the word as it is a rough translation of Arabic, "janjaweed" 
will be used herein. 
49 
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Despite the unmistakable tragedy that has occurred and continues to oc-
cur, the international community has utterly failed to respond. Debate 
over whether the term "genocide" should be used to describe the ethnic 
cleansing and displacement of nearly a quarter of a million people in 
Sudan has essentially deterred any type of humanitarian intervention 
from other nations that have signed or ratified the Genocide Convention. 3 
Although the U.S. Government has called the crisis a "genocide," the 
United Nations and the rest of the world has yet to do so, and has failed 
to respond in a timely manner that could have prevented countless deaths 
and ended the violence. 
Recently, a report by a United Nations-appointed commission of inquiry 
into whether genocide occurred in the Darfur region has found that the 
Sudanese Government and the janjaweed militia are responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, and strongly 
recommended referring the matter to the International Criminal Court. 
While this is indeed commendable, the Committee incredibly concluded 
that the Government had not pursued a policy of genocide despite such 
compelling evidence as the fact that Government forces (with the help of 
the government-backed militia) conducted "indiscriminate attacks," in-
cluding killing civilians, torture, abductions, destruction of villages, rape, 
pillaging and forced displacement. 4 The Commission further opined that 
although crimes "no less heinous than genocide" had been committed, 
nevertheless, the crucial element of "genocidal intent" appeared to be 
missing. 5 
In February 2005, the UN Security Council announced that over 10,000 
troops, as part of a United Nations peace support operation, would be 
deployed to the Sudan for monitoring and verification of the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement ("SPLM"), a "rebel force," as 
signed on January 9, 2005.6 While this action is applauded, nevertheless, 
it appears to have been too little too late. 
3. Officially called the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide," passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 and coming into effect in 
January 1951, hereinafter referred to as the "Genocide Convention." 
4. U.N. News Centre, u.N. Commission Finds Sudanese Government Responsiblefor Crimes 
in Darfor (Feb. 1,2005) <www.un.org>. 
5. [d. 
6. U.N. Security Council Press Release 8305, UN Ready for 10,000 Strong Troop Deploy-
ment in Sudan to Monitor Peace Agreement (Feb. 2, 2005) <www.un.org>; UN Security Council 
Press Release 8306, Sudan Peace Agreement Signed 9 January Historic Opportunity (Feb. 8, 2005) 
<www.un.org>. 
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It has been almost three years since the brutal attacks began, resulting in 
the deaths of tens of thousands civilians, and the displacement of almost 
two million more. Yet, the failure of the UN and the rest of the world to 
respond in that time raises both a moral and legal question: if the system-
atic and calculated murder of unanned men and boys, the abduction and 
rape of women and girls, the destruction of villages as well as the de-
struction of food and water supplies, is not enough to warrant military 
and/or diplomatic intervention - what in the world will? 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL STRIFE LEADING TO THE 
COORDINATED AND SYSTEMATIC ATTACKS BY THE SUDANESE 
GOVERNMENT AND "JANJA WEED" MILITIA UPON CIVILIANS IN THE 
DARFUR REGION 
Sudan, the largest nation in Africa, has been mostly mired in civil war 
since it won its independence from Great Britain in 1956.7 The central 
conflict in the ongoing war has been between the Muslim government 
forces in the North, and rebels in the South, which began in 1955, de-
clined in 1972, and resumed in 1983. Over the course of time, some two 
million people died as a result of the conflict, most of them Christians. 
The Darfur region is Sudan's largest region, located in the western part 
of the country. Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1917, when it 
was the last region to be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 
Since 1994, Darfur has been divided into South, West and North regions. 
Much of the current crisis has taken place in West Darfur, an ethnically 
mixed region of Africans and Arabs, though African groups predomi-
nate. 8 The Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa communities are some of the most 
predominant ethnic groups of West Darfur, and have also been the prin-
cipal victims of the government's military campaign.9 All of these tribes 
are largely peasant farmers, but also engage in cattle raising. Both the 
Masalit and Fur have united in marriage with Arabs and other Africans. 10 
The conflicts in the Darfur region have continued since the early 1980's. 
Because Darfur is geographically isolated, it has been neglected by the 
central government in Khartoum. Much of the peace between the re-
gion's ethnic groups have been destroyed due to environmental degrada-
tion from the spread of the Sahara desert as a result of ongoing drought, 
7. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001-2004) <www.bartelby.com>. 
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING By GOVERNMENT AND 
MILITIA FORCE IN WESTERN SUDAN 16, No. 6(A), (May 2004). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
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coupled with "divide and rule" tactics of the central government and the 
influx of modem weaponry. II 
Early conflicts were predominantly clashes between Arab nomadic 
groups with these farming communities, over access to pasture and water 
for cattle, or outright theft of animals. Since the 1980's, drought has 
driven these nomadic tribes to systematically occupy the land in the cen-
tral part of the Darfur region, known as Jebel Marra massif. At one 
point, the conflict rose to the level of a civil war, with entire villages 
destroyed and thousands of lives lost on both sides. Despite attempts by 
these nomadic groups to survive as livestock herders by seizing land in 
the fertile central zone, the Fur - the predominant occupants - have 
fought back to retain what they have long-viewed as "their land."12 This 
resulted in the start of government-initiated hostilities against the Fur for 
resisting the nomads' intrusion rather than seeking accommodation of 
them. 
The Zaghawa were also among the people attempting to resettle in the 
central region and encountered hostility from the Fur farmers. Eventu-
ally, the Zaghawa would also become a target of government, pro-Arab 
hostilities against all "zurga" (a derogatory term for "black") and non-
Arab groups of Darfur, which eventually prompted the Fur to form their 
own militias. Initially these militias were utilized for self-defense, but 
were later folded into the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement 
("SLA/M"), that sought equality for all Sudanese. 
Between 1987 and 1989, the conflicts between Fur farmers and Arabs 
intensified so much that thousands of Fur were killed, tens of thousands 
more were displaced, and over 40,000 homes were destroyed. I3 Instead 
of intervening in the conflicts to defuse tensions, Khartoum ignored 
them, allowing them to explode some fourteen years later. 
In the 1990's, hostilities resumed in West Darfur (among other places), 
particularly in 1998, when Arab nomads prematurely moved their flocks 
into land predominantly populated by Masalit farmers. During the 1998 
conflict, more than sixty Masalit villages were destroyed, an Arab village 
was burned, both Masalit and Arabs were killed and more than five thou-
sand Masalit were displaced. 14 Despite a resolution of the conflict being 
reached, hostilities again broke out in 1999, with more than 125 Masalit 
11. Sudan Update, Reports: Peoples, Darfor <www.sudanupdate.org>. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING By GOVERNMENT AND 
MILITIA FORCE IN WESTERN SUDAN 16, at 6(A), (May 2004). 
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villages partially or totally destroyed and hundreds killed, including local 
Arab tribal chiefs. 15 The government brought in military forces to stop 
the violence. Yet, the violence that ensued from these attacks further 
polarized the pro-Arab government away from its black citizens. 
The current humanitarian crisis essentially began early in the morning of 
April 25, 2003, when a blast followed by six rapid detonations shook a 
tiny one-runway airport in El Fasher, where Sudanese soldiers were sta-
tioned. The blasts roused sleeping soldiers out of their barracks only to 
be ambushed by machine-gun fire from the rebel SLAIM. With only two 
hundred sixty men, forty Toyota Land Cruisers and mostly small-arms, 
this "rag-tag" group managed to take over a vital military outpost of the 
Sudanese Army, and kidnapped the head of the Sudanese Air Force, 
whom they released forty-five days later. 16 
The SLAIM emerged as an answer to Khartoum's disregard for maintain-
ing infrastructure and politically marginalizing blacks in the Darfur re-
gion. The government had refused to repair roads or maintain other pub-
lic services, and engaged in a policy of awarding top government posi-
tions to local Arabs. Frustrated by political and economic isolation, the 
SLAIM sought to strike back against the Sudanese government while 
drawing the world's attention to their political plight. At first Khartoum 
did not take the SLAIM seriously; but after the attack at El Fasher, the 
government determined that it had to treat the SLAIM as a major threat. 17 
During conflicts with SLAIM rebels in the south of the country, the Su-
danese military perfected a strategy to combat insurgents: air forces 
would attack from the sky while Arab tribesmen, armed by the govern-
ment, would concurrently attack from the ground. These Arab militia, or 
janjaweed were particularly important in Darfur, since a majority of the 
Sudanese Army were from Darfur and could not be trusted to take up 
arms against former neighbors and kin. 18 By July 2003, the government 
was appealing to Arabs in Darfur to protect their homeland from the "re-
bels." It would be the first step to laying the groundwork for the series of 
coordinated attacks by the Sudanese Government and the janjaweed 
against its unarmed black citizens. 
As a result of the history of violence, the Sudanese Government, together 
with the janjaweed, began targeting the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
15. /d. 
16. Power, Dying in Darfur, THE NEW YORKER, (Aug. 30, 2004). 
17. Id. 
18. /d. 
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through a combination of indiscriminate, deliberate and coordinated ae-
rial and ground attacks, denial of humanitarian assistance, and a cam-
paign of terror that has resulted in the displacement of over a million and 
a half civilians. The Sudanese Government left almost no stones un-
turned in attacks upon anyone suspected of having any allegiance to the 
rebel movement. 
Since mid-2003, the coordinated attacks by the Sudanese Army and the 
janjaweed have resulted in mass killings of mostly unarmed men and 
boys. Mass killings of civilians in Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa areas have 
taken three forms: (1) extrajudicial executions of men, by the army and 
the janjaweed; (2) attacks in which government soldiers and janjaweed 
have played an equal role fighting side by side and/or (3) attacks in 
which government forces have played a supporting role to the janjaweed 
- "softening up" villages with heavier weapons than those carried by the 
janjaweed, providing logistical support, or giving the janjaweed protec-
tion as they leave. 19 
In almost all the reported attacks, the janjaweed have the imprimatur of 
the government. Numerous witnesses and victims have described the 
janjaweed arriving at the same time as and leaving with the government 
forces, wearing uniforms similar to government uniforms, utilizing simi-
lar arms and equipment as that utilized by government soldiers, and 
seeming to coordinate ground attacks with aerial bombardment by gov-
ernment aircraft. 20 Eyewitnesses have also reported that during attacks, 
the janjaweed have made such statements as "we are the government!"21 
leaving no doubt as to the relationship between the government and the 
janjaweed. 
As to the attacks,eyewitnesses reported government soldiers and jan-
jaweed working in concert or coordinating their attacks on villages so as 
to not only spread their destruction, but also to ensure that villages are 
not reoccupied. The brutal attacks often started with government heli-
copters, flying at low levels, knowing that the probability of ground at-
tack was remote, and engaging in reconnaissance of villages prior to a 
full-scale attack. Then, aerial barrages ensued, consisting of hurling ex-
plosives and/or other crude armaments such as barrels of nails, car chas-
sis, or old appliances from planes in order to crush people and property. 22 
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: EmNIC CLEANSING By GOVERNMENT AND 
MILITIA FORCE IN WESTERN SUDAN 16, No. 6(A), (May 2004). 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. Save Darfur, Violence and Suffering in Sudan's Darfur <www.savedarfiJr.org>. 
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Concurrent with the aerial attacks, government soldiers and/or janjaweed 
went into the villages lacking security from rebel forces, and engaged in 
campaigns of looting, abductions, grisly murders,23 beatings, ethnic hu-
miliation, and destruction of property and basic necessities. 24 Fleeing 
villagers were targeted in aerial bombings and shootings. 25 These ground 
assaults were often accompanied by attackers shouting racially deroga-
tory terms and epithets as bullets sprayed their victims. 26 In addition, 
both the government soldiers and janjaweed abducted women and girls 
who were not killed in the assault, taking them to nearby fields where 
they were repeatedly raped. 27 
A few days after a village had been attacked, government helicopters 
would return to the "scoped out villages" to ensure that, in fact, the vil-
lages were empty and had not been reoccupied. If any villagers had re-
turned, government soldiers andjanjaweedwould return to further attack 
the village, killing and burning who and what was left to ensure that the 
village was not reoccupied. 28 Since the coordinated attacks began, many 
of the destroyed villages have been reoccupied by the janjaweed and 
their families, while over a million and a half black Sudanese have been 
displaced from their homes. 
B. THE CURRENT SITUATION - A LARGE-SCALE HUMANITARIAN 
CRISIS WITH MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS ITS VICTIMS 
1. Displacement of Over More Than One Million Refugees 
Currently, over 200,000 displaced Darfur refugees have resettled in 
makeshift tents in refugee camps just across the Chad border. Some 
refugees, displaced from their homes and villages, have not been able to 
cross the Sahara Desert into Chad, and have set up refugee camps in the 
western portion of Darfur. The United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) continues to set up camps, recently opening its 
twelfth camp.29 Many towns and villages in the Sudan, once occupied by 
23. The most common method of killing was execution-style shooting of men and boys. 
Victims have also reported incidents ofjanjaweed burning families alive in their homes, as well as 
tossing babies and small children into burning huts as their parents fled. 
24. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 11182, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR (2004). 
25. ld. 
26. Such statements include, "Kill the Nuba! Kill the Nuba!" (a derogatory term for black 
Sudanese). note 19; see also, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 11182, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN 
DARFUR (2004). 
27. ld. 
28. !d. 
29. Reuters AlertNet, UNHCR Opens 12'h Comp in Eastern Chad (May 3, 2005) 
<www.alertnet.org>. 
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tens of thousands of Darfurians are now essentially ghost towns number-
ing in the hundreds at best. 
In any event, both western Darfur and eastern Chad are grim landscapes 
upon which anyone can hope to survive. The land is dry and the land-
scape is intensely hot. Refugees have nothing more than tents to protect 
them from the sun and sand. Food is scarce, and the wood for fire in the 
immediate surroundings of the refugee camps is even more scarce. In 
the Sudanese culture, wood gathering is a woman's work. However, 
having to look for wood too far from these camps make women and girls 
prey to the government soldiers and janjaweed that continue to stalk the 
camps. 30 
2. A Vulnerable and Unprotected Population 
The current situation is that refugees are not out of immediate danger for 
further attacks, nor are they completely out of harm's way within the 
camps. First and most tragically, the UNHCR has grossly underesti-
mated the scope of the tragedy in the Sudan, and thus the total number of 
refugees requiring assistance. As of January 2005, over 200,000 refu-
gees have fled across the border into neighboring Chad, and another 1.6 
million are displaced within Darfur. 31 Not surprisingly, given the calcu-
lated and systematic approach to the attacks as described above, nearly 
80% of the refugees that have fled to Chad are women and children. 32 
Unfortunately, those fleeing to Chad have found that it is a remote, desert 
region where natural resources like food or water, are scarce. 33 
Ironically, some of the refugee camps have proven to be not much in the 
way of "refuge" for the thousands that have fled the ongoing violence. 
Since August 2004, the UN has been able to intervene with some hu-
manitarian assistance in the form of food, water, and makeshift shelter. 34 
However, many of the UN camps are grossly overcrowded, with camps 
designed for 6,000, actually holding three times that number. 35 Many of 
the camps still lack clean water, sanitation, and food, although UN relief 
workers have been present for months. Infants and children are particu-
larly at risk as they become severely malnourished and susceptible to 
disease from drinking water utilized by animals, causing many to be-
30. U.N. News Centre, Darfor's Displaced Remain Traumatized and at Risk of Rape, Harass-
ment, (Aug. 2004) <www.un.org>. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. Costello, Chad/Sudan: A Question of Genocide (Sept. 2004) 
<www.pbs.orglfrontlineworld>. 
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come sick. The World Health Organization has reported that as of Sep-
tember 2004, between 6,000 and 10,000 people in Darfur camps in die 
every month due to unsafe water and living in unsanitary conditions; 
many of them are aged 5 and under.36 
In addition to the unsanitary conditions of the camps, the refugees have 
literally no protection from the harsh elements of the ChadlDarfur border 
landscape - hard, arid, barren desert land subject to unrelenting heat and 
constant sandstorms. In many of the camps in Chad, four sticks in the 
ground constitute "home."37 Some make roofs or a shelter by draping or 
affixing a cloth to the sticks. On sunny days with no wind, such a make-
shift shelter provides some respite from the heat; however, on days with 
wind and sandstorms, "home" may blow across the desert. 
The UNHCR mobile monitoring teams have also monitored security in 
West Darfur and near the Chad border. As a result of attacks in some of 
the camps, as of late July 2004, the UNHCR has had to move over 
140,000 refugees to safer camps deeper inside Chad,38 and another 
65,000 as of early October 2004.39 The UNHCR teams also monitor 
movements of people and have found that as the violence continues in 
Darfur, so have the numbers of refugees fleeing towards the border.40 
3. How the Sudanese Government Has Contributed to the Crisis -
And How It Continues To Perpetuate the Crisis 
Despite the fact that over a million and a half people have been displaced 
as a result of the systematic attacks upon unarmed civilians, the Sudanese 
Government is doing little to offer anything in the way of aid to refugees. 
Sanitation in the camps is poor, raising worries among those providing 
humanitarian assistance of the possibility of an outbreak or cholera or 
measles. Some observers indicate that these may be the precise condi-
tions that the Sudanese Government wanted, in order to eliminate dis-
placed civilians naturally. As if the very real threat of disease was not 
enough, refugees living in the camps live under the continuing threat of 
attacks from the janjaweed. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. UNHCHR, ChadiDarfor Emergency: UNHCHR Back in Chad's Violence-Hit 
Camps;Completes Transfer From Border Town (Jul. 27, 2004) <www.unhchr.ch>. 
39. UNHCHR, ChadiDaifur Emergency: UNHCHR Still Working to Move Refogees From 
Chad-Sudan Border (Oct. 9, 2004) <www.unhchr.ch>. 
40. UNHCHR, ChadiDaifur Emergency (Feb. 2005) <www.unhchr.ch>. 
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The UN reports that despite the numbers that have already fled, the at-
tacks continue. 41 Those who have been displaced have no real prospect 
of returning home to escape the threat, as the janjaweed continue their 
assault on African villages. With the crisis gaining more prominence in 
the world's eyes, the government has felt pressure to alleviate the crisis, 
though not in a way one would expect. In August 2004, there were re-
ports of incidents in which masked gunmen swept into camps in the mid-
dle of the night, abducting village leaders. The leaders would return the 
next day, apparently injured, reporting that their assailants threatened to 
kill them if they did not take their people home. 42 
In April 2004, the SLA and the Sudanese Government signed a tempo-
rary cease-fire, and the African Union (A.U.) agreed to send a hundred 
and twenty unarmed monitors to Darfur. 43 These monitors were limited 
to investigating violations of the cease-fire and were not supposed to 
combat the biggest threat, namely, the continued attacks on Darfur civil-
ians by thejanjaweed and the military.44 In late July 2004, the UN Secu-
rity Council passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the jan-
jaweed and the SLAiM rebels, and threatening the Sudanese Government 
with "further action," such as an asset freeze or travel ban, if it did not 
show substantial progress within thirty days in disarming the janjaweed 
and bringing war criminals to justice.45 But the Sudanese Government 
made it clear that it had no intention of disarming Arab tribal leaders. 46 
Further, as of January 2005, the African Union monitoring force has re-
ported that the violence continues. There are also reports that the Suda-
nese Government continues to arm the janjaweed militias and continues 
to bomb and attack civilians. Many of the refugees in Chad still face 
cross-border raids by the janjaweed, and dangerous isolation during the 
rainy season, when aid deliveries are almost impossible. Women are un-
der . a constant threat of being raped while gathering wood for fire if 
forced to look for wood too far from the camps.47 
What is needed now in Darfur is an international peacekeeping and pro-
tection presence, precisely what the Sudanese Government wants to 
avoid most. 48 Only recently, in February 2005, has the UN announced 
41. Reuters, Darfor Attacks Horrify UN Envoy (Feb. 2,2005) <www.cnn.com>. 
42. !d. 
43. ld. 
44. ld. 
45. ld. 
46. Power, Dying in Darfor, THE NEW YORKER, (Aug. 30, 2004). 
47. World Vision, Humanitarian Aid for Sudanese in Darfor and Chad (Nov. 4, 2004) 
<www.domino-201.worldvision.org>. 
48. ld. 
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that a peacekeeping force will be deployed in southern Sudan to monitor 
the Peace Agreement between the Government and the SPLIM. It is 
sorely needed, as there have been numerous reports of the Sudanese 
Government threatening to force refugees to go home. The refugees 
refuse, knowing full well that they face the threat of further attacks. 49 
Most refuse to return home until they know that it is safe to do so, that is, 
when the government rids the country of the janjaweed. 50 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY ON INTERVENTION 
IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS - HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
A. MERNA TIONAL INTERVENTION - AN UNSETTLED PROPOSITION 
While there are only two accepted legal bases for using force under the 
UN Charter,51 customary norms have allowed for a third -- the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes. However, while all member nations 
may recognize a need for some type of humanitarian intervention, the use 
of force as part of such an intervention has been a dubious proposition at 
best. In the case of civil war, many nations will not intervene, even if a 
humanitarian crisis is afoot. In other cases, humanitarian intervention 
has been used as a pretext for political and military intervention in an-
other nation's domestic affairs. 52 In any event, recent history such as the 
intervention in Kosovo and the non-intervention in Rwanda have taught 
that a nation engaging in humanitarian intervention walks a fine line in-
deed. 
1. The Intervention in Kosovo 
When NATO forces intervened militarily in Kosovo to stop Slobodan 
Milosevic's "ethnic cleansing" campaign waged against ethnic Albani-
ans, such intervention faced severe international criticism until NATO's 
bombing campaign proved successful. NATO's use of force in Kosovo 
presented a legal dilemma in that its military action did not fit either of 
the two accepted legal bases for using force under the UN Charter. 
49. ld.; see also, Reuters, Darfor Refugees Live Within Sight of Their Homes (Feb. 10,2005). 
50. Reuters, Darfor Refugees Live Within Sigh/of Their Homes (Feb. 10,2005). 
51. The two accepted legal bases for using force under U.N. Charter Article 2(4) are the right 
of individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack, or authorization of force by 
the U.N. Security Council. Clearly, the situation in Darfur falls under neither of these categories as 
of yet. 
52. ld. 
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NATO's chief justification for military intervention was that the Kosovo 
crisis had implications for stability in the entire region. 53 
The killings in Kosovo began in late February/early March 1998, in a 
small town of Prekaz, when Serb paramilitary units stormed through 
ethnic Albanian villages, killing scores of people. Whole families were 
burned alive in their homes; women, children and elderly were among 
the victims. 54 In the coming months, more innocent Albanians would die 
and more refugees would flee as a result of the Serb offensives launched 
against rebellious Kosovar Albanians. 
After the initial FebruarylMarch attack, then-Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright determined that Slobodan Milosevic had to be stopped 
immediately before more violence and deaths ensued. 55 Unfortunately, it 
took over a year and a half, with numerous conferences and negotiations 
and the eventual NATO air strikes commencing, before Russia and 
China would agree to a Security Council resolution that would provide a 
framework for a military agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia, and 
allow a peacekeeping force in Kosovo. 
On March 23, 1999, NATO initiated air operations. Before the bombing 
campaign began, the Serb offensive had already driven 100,000 Kos-
ovars from their homes. Milosevic's apparent goal, not unlike that of the 
Sudanese Government,56 was to quash the opposition and reestablish an 
ethnic balance on a permanent basis. 57 Despite the fact that there was no 
agreement from the Russians for the strikes or a Security Council au-
thorization for NATO's use of force, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
was supportive of the strikes. The Secretary General recalled the atroci-
ties that had taken place in Bosnia only a couple of years before, stating 
"[there] are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit 
ofpeace."58 Moreover, in a speech in Geneva to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the Secretary General also stated that" 'ethnic cleansers' 
and those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights will 
find no justification or refuge in the UN Charter."59 
53. Albright, MADAM SECRETARY 381 (2003). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See, U.N. News Centre, UN Commission Finds Sudanese Government Responsible for 
Crimes in Darfur (Feb. 1,2005) <www.un.org>. 
57. Albright, MADAM SECRETARY 408-409 (2003). 
58. Holzgrefe & Keohane, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention (Spring 2002) 
<www.law.georgetown.edu>. 
59. !d. 
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2. Kosovo as a Roadmap for the Sudan? 
The NATO air strikes lasted for eleven weeks,60 and during that time, 
Milosevic continued his murderous assault against Kosovar Albanians, 
sending another million fleeing from their homes. 61 The strikes inflicted 
a great deal of damage on the infrastructure of Milosevic' s government 
and forces. As such, on June 3, Milosevic accepted a deal the Russians 
could agree to, which would allow Milosevic to withdraw his troops and 
end the conflict. 62 Shortly thereafter, a Security Council resolution was 
drafted that provided the framework for a military agreement between 
NATO and Yugoslavia, and determined the timing of the withdrawal of 
Serb forces. 63 On June 9, Yugoslav forces began to withdraw. Once 
withdrawal was verified, NATO halted its military operations the next 
day.64 Once NATO halted its operations, Russia agreed to vote on the 
Security Council resolution65 authorizing a peacekeeping force. Thereaf-
ter, peacekeeping forces were deployed. And soon after that, refugees 
returned to their homes. 
While the road to disarmament and peace was long, arduous and by no 
means perfect, because of the intervention by NATO forces the numbers 
of those killed and/or displaced were greatly reduced. While NATO 
forces may not have a direct interest in the affairs in African countries, 
nevertheless, a similar diplomatic negotiation among G8 nations could 
have taken place to curb the violence and the sheer numbers of refugees. 
In any event, the process to peace in Kosovo is an admirable effort that 
could have been duplicated to achieve peace in the Sudan, thereby avoid-
ing needless deaths and the displacement of over a million refugees. 
3. Absence ofIntervention in the Rwandan Crisis 
Only a few years before Kosovo, ethnic Hutus in Rwanda began murder-
ing the minority Tutsi population (along with moderate Hutus). Not only 
was intervention non-existent, but a little more than two weeks after the 
killings began, the UN Security Council voted to cut the UN force in 
Rwanda from 2,500 to 800. 66 Over 800,000 Rwandans were killed in 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. The resolution was drafted and negotiated by G8 foreign ministers in 12 hours time, on 
June 7-8, 1999. See, Albright, MADAM SECRETARY 420-21 (2003). 
66. Fleischer, Shake Hands With the Devil: An Interview With Romeo Dallaire (Jan. 25, 2005) 
<www.motheIjones.com> . 
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100 days.67 To add insult to injury, like the current situation in Darfur, 
the UN was either reluctant or flatly refused to call it a "genocide." 
Civil unrest between the Tutsis and the Hutus began during colonization 
of Rwanda by Belgium, and ensued over the next forty years. This was 
the result of Belgian colonists treating the Tutsis as being superior to the 
Hutus. 68 Attacks against the Tutsis over the years resulted in approxi-
mately 200,000 Tutsi refugees fleeing to Uganda,69 and regrouping as a 
rebel force known as Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),70 with the intent of 
taking on the increasingly corrupt Hutu government to achieve political 
equality for the Tutsis. 71 The government seized the opportunity to de-
nounce the Tutsis and blame them for any and all government setbacks. 72 
This resulted in one of the most virulent, anti-Tutsi hatred campaigns in 
Rwandan history. 
By 1994, tensions between the government and the RPF were at an all-
time high. Violence was continuing to escalate. By late March, there 
were reports of weapons being distributed to Hutu civilians. 73 The situa-
tion boiled over on April 6, 1994 when Rwandan President Juvenal Ha-
byarimana's plane was shot down by two surface-to-air missiles. 74 
Rwandan authorities immediately seized on the tragedy as an opportunity 
to blame the RPF. 75 Militia and army units were deployed, and road-
blocks were set. 76 For the next 100 days, a genocidal fury ensued that 
would result in over 800,000 people being hacked,77 shot, strangled, 
clubbed and burned to death. A majority of these were unarmed civil-
ians, predominately Tutsis, though some moderate Hutus also perished. 
a. Lack of Intervention in the Massacre 
Despite the extreme circumstances presented by the massacre, the U.S. 
response was utterly lacking. Though the Clinton administration fol-
lowed the situation closely, it failed to use the word "genocide." The 
Defense Department established a task force that collected and for-
warded information on the situation, including the numbers killed, and 
67. CBC News, Indepth: Sudan - The Genocide Convention (Sept. 20, 2004) <www.cbc.ca>. 
68. Norton, Rwanda (Jul. 11,2000) <www.au.af.miVauiawc/awcgate/navy/pmilrwanda.pdf>. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. !d. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. The weapons of choice for many civilian attackers were machetes. 
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u.S. Marines were deployed to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citi-
zens, but that was the extent of U.S. military intervention. The U.S. did 
not intervene or engage in peacekeeping in Rwanda. The question of 
sending US troops as part of either a unilateral or multilateral force was 
raised but there was no call for Congress to send troops, as the tragedy in 
Somalia was fresh in the minds of many members of Congress. 
At one point, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) volunteered to 
contribute forces, but funding for those forces would have to be pro-
vided. No funding was forthcoming, as there was little public support for 
involvement in Rwanda. Although UN troops were present when the 
massacre began, eventually they were withdrawn for safety reasons, and 
reinforcements were denied. 78 
While no urgent need to intervene was perceived at the time, there has 
been quite a bit of handwringing since. Almost twelve years have 
passed, and Rwanda is still considered one of the worst massacres in 
history. In 1999, President Clinton stopped in Rwanda to apologize for 
his "hands-off' policy and pledged that never again would the U.S. fail 
to act in the face of such compelling evidence. 
Many have criticized the Clinton administration for its failure to act and 
rightly so. The compelling evidence of genocide required that other na-
tions as well as the UN take action. The former head of the UN peace-
keeping mission in Rwanda, Retired General Romeo Dallaire has written 
and spoken extensively on the subject,79 and opines that action was not 
taken in Rwanda due to the self-interests of nations, that the gain was not 
there and the risks were too high. 80 
b. The Racism of Intervention - Are the Standards for Intervention 
Applied Consistently? 
While the massacres in Kosovo were certainly enough to grab the 
world's attention, the number of total deaths is not anywhere near the 
estimated total of those that have perished in either Darfur, or in the 
Rwandan massacre of 1994. Tens of thousands have been killed in Dar-
fur, while it is well known that 800,000 Rwandans were killed in that 
government-orchestrated massacre. As late as November 1999, the esti-
78. Fleischer, Shake Hands With the Devil: An Interview With Romeo Dallaire (Jan. 25, 2005) 
<www.MotherJones.com>. 
79. See, DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA 
512-520 (2003). 
80. Fleischer, Shake Hands With the Devil: An Interview With Romeo Dallaire (Jan. 25, 2005) 
<www.MotherJones.com>. 
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mated number of total dead in Kosovo was between 10,000 and 20,000.81 
This raises yet another ethical and moral question: whether intervention 
in government-sponsored genocide is in fact based on race. In the midst 
of criticism leveled at the lack of intervention in both the crises in 
Rwanda and Darfur is the question of the difference between the Bosnia 
and Kosovo conflicts, in which U.S. and NATO forces intervened, and 
the Rwanda and Darfur crises, where the U.S. and other nations refuse to 
use the "genocide" label, let alone intervene to stop it. 
Many critics have placed the difference squarely upon the issue of race. 
The former head of UN security forces for Rwanda attributes the inter-
vention in Kosovo to the residual influence of the colonial era; Yugosla-
via is white, located in Europe and is closer to home. Whereas in Africa, 
there is a tendency to trivialize Africans as always engaging in "tribal-
ism," leaving an impression that some count whereas others do not. 82 
Unfortunately, this also raises an ethical and moral dilemma, as genocide 
is neither race nor gender specific. 
During the Rwandan massacre, the Congressional Black Caucus was 
surprisingly silent on whether the U.S. should intervene to stop the mas-
sacre. President Clinton specifically sought out the Congressional Black 
Caucus' level of interest in the issue, but it had not called for interven-
tion. Again, it is believed that the political and military dimensions that 
were presented with the tragedy in Somalia would not be repeated, thus 
making even the CBC wary of intervening in another African civil war. 
As to the crisis in Darfur on the other hand, the Congressional Black 
Caucus has been quite vocal. In June 2004, ranking members of the 
CBC took part in a joint press conference in which they brought attention 
to the crisis by seeking 10,000 signatures to deliver to then-Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, to compel the U.S. to intervene militarily to stop the 
genocide. 83 Since that time, members of the CBC have continually 
called for the Bush administration to take action on the crisis in Darfur, 
so as to avoid a repeat of that which occurred in Rwanda. 84 Thus far, no 
81. CNN, UN Investigators Expect Death Toll to Climb (Nov. 10, 1999) <www.cnn.com> 
(estimated at 11,324); IDEA, Kosovo: Orders of Magnitude, 5 IDEA 1 (July 25, 2000) 
<www.ideajoumal.com>. 
82. Id. 
83. AFRICA ACTION, CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS JOINS AFRICA ACTION IN CALL FOR US 
INTERVENTION TO STOP GENOCIDE IN DARFUR (Jun. 23, 2004). 
84. See, press release, CBC Chairman Elijah E. Cummings Comments on Meeting with Secre-
tary Powell Regarding Sudan Crisis (Jul. 23, 2004); press release, Rep. Payne Urges Action at 
Congressional Black Caucus Press Conference on the Crisis in Darfur, Sudan (Jun. 23, 2004); 
Epstein, Oakland Lawmaker Calls on World to Aid Darfur. SAN FRANCISCO CHRONlCLE, Jan. 25, 
2005. 
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action has been taken by the Bush administration. However, most inter-
esting is the fact that the CBC has not made any allegation that the fail-
ure to intervene in Rwanda was due to racism. As recent press confer-
ences indicate, the CBC makes only passing references to Rwanda, but 
no comparison to KoSOVO. 85 
III. THE DARFUR CRISIS: MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS 
A. THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE 
CRIME OF GENOCIDE 
Genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide,86 passed by the United Nations General As-
sembly in December 1948, as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" by vari-
ous means,87 that seek as its end, the annihilation of a people. The Geno-
cide Convention states that not only is the act of genocide a punishable 
act, but it also includes as punishable offense conspiracy to commit 
genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide as 
well as complicity in genocide. 88 The Convention further provides that 
punishment for the crime of genocide not only applies to government 
rulers and officials, but also to private individuals. 89 
The Genocide Convention came about largely through the efforts of one 
man, Ralph Lemkin, a Polish Jew who first began to warn the world 
85. [d. 
86. Known in short as the "Genocide Convention." 
87. The full text of Article II of the Convention reads as follows: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
88. The full text of Article III of the Convention reads as follows: 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
89. The full text of Article IV of the Convention reads as follows: 
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals. 
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about Adolf Hitler's plan to attack Jews in Europe as early as 1933. 
Lemkin was inspired by a speech by British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill that had described what Germany was doing as "a crime with-
out a name."90 
In 1944, Lemkin published a long, scholarly account of the Holocaust 
that included copies of Hitler's anti-Jewish decrees in his book, Axis Rule 
in Occupied Europe. 91 In Axis Rule, Lemkin coined a new phrase, 
"genocide," to describe the crime that went beyond murder to the annihi-
lation of a people. Within a week of its publication, the Roosevelt ad-
ministration seized upon the term to describe what was happening in 
Europe. Not long after that, "genocide" gained widespread usage when 
the media began using the word in its news coverage. 92 
In the years after World War II, the newly created United Nations de-
clared the Nazi atrocities as "crimes against humanity," and set out to 
create new standards on the laws and customs of war. 93 After the Nur-
emberg judgment, the UN General Assembly declared genocide an inter-
national crime. 94 Through the intense lobbying efforts of Ralph Lemkin, 
in 1948 the UN General Assembly drafted and unanimously adopted the 
convention aimed at the prevention and punishment of genocide,95 which 
was ratified on January 12, 1951. 
For over forty years after World War II, the Genocide Convention was 
relegated to obscurity as human rights focused on more modern viola-
tions such as apartheid, torture and disappearances. 96 With the events in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, the Convention was brought back into the 
limelight once more. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur should be added 
to the list of events of worldwide significance demanding immediate 
interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention, and all the 
acts that fall under its jurisdiction. 
90. CBC News, lndepth: Sudan - The Genocide Convention (Sept. 20, 2004) <www.cbc.ca>; 
Schabas, Special Report 41: The Genocide Convention at Fifty. United States Institute of Peace, 
(Jan. 7, 1999). 
91. ld. 
92. CBC News, lndepth: Sudan - The Genocide Convention (Sept. 20,2004) <www.cbc.ca>. 
93. SCHABAS, SPECIAL REpORT 41: THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AT FIFTY (United States 
Institute of Peace ed., Jan. 7, 1999). 
94. ld. 
95. ld. 
96. ld. 
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1. Genocide 
Because genocide is a crime of intent, the crucial question is the purpose 
of the offender, not the result. 97 Even if the numbers of those killed are 
relatively low, the crime can be considered genocide if the intent is to 
destroy a group "in whole or in part."98 Whereas there are large numbers 
of victims, the intent is relatively easy to prove, and can be easily de-
duced from the given facts. 99 
In the case of the crisis in Darfur, there is little question that what oc-
curred was genocide. Large numbers of victims, estimated in the tens of 
thousands, have been subject to a pattern of coordinated atrocities: kill-
ings, rapes and destruction of property, all due to their ethnicity. The 
facts indicate that the predominantly Arab government and its militias 
committed genocide by targeting non-Arabs 100 in its campaign of mass 
murder of national, ethnic and tribal groups, and in forcing those groups 
into such adverse conditions so as to bring about their destruction natu-
rally. 
Yet, there has been much debate as to whether or not Khartoum had 
genocide specifically in mind, giving rise to the reluctance of the world 
and the UN to refer to the crisis in Darfur as such. In July 2004, both 
houses of Congress unanimously passed concurrent resolutions calling 
the crisis genocide. 101 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell testified 
before the Senate foreign relations committee that the pattern of atroci-
ties and displacement of people in Darfur lead to the conclusion that 
genocide had in fact occurred. 102 Nevertheless, despite the Bush admini-
stration's conclusion that the crisis is in fact genocide, no intervention 
has been offered by the United States. 
A UN appointed commission of inquiry into the crisis recently concluded 
that while the Sudanese Government and the janjaweed militia are in fact 
responsible for the indiscriminate attacks on unarmed civilians that con-
stitute war crimes, the Government nevertheless did not pursue a policy 
97. !d. 
98. ld. 
99. [d. 
100. Because the only other race of people in the Sudan aside from Arabs are black Sudanese, 
though belonging to various tribes, it is presumed that the intended targets by the Government and 
its militias were of one race - black. See also Power, supra note 16. 
101. !d. 
102. CBC News,lndepth: Sudan - The Genocide Convention (Sept. 20, 2004) <www.cbc.ca>; 
Straus, Darfor and the Genocide Debate, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Jan./Feb. 2005). 
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of genocide. 103 The Commission concluded that two elements of geno-
cide may be deduced from the gross violations of human rights by the 
Government and thejalyaweed militia: first, the actus reus, consisting of 
the killing, or the act of causing serious bodily or mental harm, or delib-
erately inflicting conditions of life most likely to bring about the destruc-
tion of a group of people; second, the existence of a protected group be-
ing targeted for criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the Commission fur-
ther concluded that the essential element of genocide, the intent to com-
mit genocide, was missing, as it appeared that intent of the government 
and the janjaweed militia in attacks on unarmed civilians and villages 
was primarily for the purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. 104 
This is a tragically erroneous conclusion. The overwhelming evidence 
indicates that the calculated and coordinated attacks were primarily tar-
geted against unarmed civilians. 105 In addition, the manner in which at-
tacks were carried out strongly suggests otherwise. 106 The aerial attacks 
focused on food, water supplies and shelters, not armory sites.107 Ground 
attacks were indiscriminate and did not appear to seek out rebel insur-
gents, or those that were armed. 108 Victims and witnesses alike assert 
that the Government and the janjaweed acted together to randomly kill, 
rape, attack and maim, without any evidence of the presence of insur-
gents,l09 and with the stated intent to kill black Sudanese. 110 
In addition, the facts of the Darfur crisis are virtually identical to those 
present in the Kosovo conflict, where there was international interven-
tion. Neither the UN nor the United States had any trouble whatsoever in 
referring to Slobodan Milosevic's campaign of murder, rape, beatings, 
burning of villages, and intentional displacement of ethnic Albanians as 
"ethnic cleansing," and therefore enough to warrant intervention. 
While the two terms "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" are not entirely 
synonymous, III they seek similar ends: to rid a territory of a population. 
103. U.N., Report of the International Commission on the Inquiry on Darfor to the United 
Nations Secretary General (Jan. 25, 2005) <www.un.org>. 
104. Id. at 4. 
105. See supra note 19; see also, Save Darfur, supra note 22; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 
11182, supra note 24. 
106. Id. 
107. See supra note 24. 
108. See supra note 19; see also, Save Darfur, supra note 22; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 
11182, supra note 24. 
109. Id. 
110. See supra note 16. 
Ill. The tenn "ethnic cleansing" refers to the intent to "cleanse" or "purify" a territory of one 
ethnic group by use of terror, rape and murder in order to convince the inhabitants to leave. "Geno-
cide" seeks to destroy the group. 
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While the Commission may have erroneously concluded that the Suda-
nese Government and its militias merely intended to rid Darfur of tribes 
inhabiting the area, numerous victims and witnesses to the attacks have 
attested that the attackers themselves expressed in intent to kill the blacks 
in Darfur. 112 This stated intent during initial attacks, coupled with fol-
low-up attacks of villages after initial air and ground assaults, attacks 
upon villagers who return to villages, attacks upon refugees in camps in 
both Darfur and Chad, as well as the intended disruption of relief opera-
tions, all evidence the intent not just to displace a people, but to com-
pletely annihilate it. 113 
2. Rape 
As stated above, reports of the crisis in Darfur include rape of women 
and girls that were not killed during an initial assault, as well as the rape 
of women and girls in the refugee camps in both Chad and Darfur. 114 
The law of war has prohibited rape by soldiers for centuries. 115 During 
armed conflict, the role of rape has been utilized as both an attack on the 
individual victim and as a method of ethnic cleansing, intended to hu-
miliate, shame, degrade and terrify an ethnic groUp.116 In World War II, 
rape was treated as an instrument of policy; the Nazi and Japanese prac-
tices of forced prostitution and rape on a large scale is an egregious ex-
ample of such policies. 117 
Although rape is specifically prohibited in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion 118 and the Additional Protocols,119 these instruments do not treat rape 
as a grave breach subject to universal jurisdiction. 120 Both the Nurem-
112. See supra note 19; see also, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 11182, supra note 24. 
113. See supra note 19; see also, Save Darfur, supra note 22; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 
11182, supra note 24. 
114. See U.N. News Centre, supra note 30; see also, supra note 19; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. 
No. 11182, supra note 24; World Vision, supra note 47. 
115. Meron, Rape As A Crime Under International Humanitarian Law 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 424 
(1993). 
116. Id. 
117. /d. 
118. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Aug. 12,1949), 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV]. 
119. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, arts. 
76(1) and 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 
16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
120. Meron, supra note liS. 
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berg and Tokyo Tribunals largely ignored gender-based crimes. 121 It was 
only recently that the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, in 
its indictment of Bosnian Serb military and police officers in connection 
with rapes of Muslim women in the Bosnian war, declared that rape is a 
war crime. 122 More recently, both the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (lCTR) have surmounted reluctance and other obstacles to 
address and prosecute individuals committing this crime. 123 
Further, Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. ambassador-at-Iarge for war 
crimes, helped to expand the definition of genocide to include organized 
violence against women as rape. After spending significant time as a 
prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (lCTR), 
Ambassador Prosper concluded that rape and mutilation had to be con-
sidered crimes so traumatizing to its victims that it made them, for all 
practical purposes, no longer able to contribute to humanity. 124 While in 
Arusha, Tanzania, Ambassador Prosper looked at the Genocide Conven-
tion and argued to the court that the Convention envisioned acts which 
fall short of death, but also caused "serious bodily harm." Ambassador 
Prosper further argued that the systematic rape of Tutsi women fell into 
that category. In the end, the court found that rape was a part of the act 
of genocide. 125 
There is no question that systematic rapes of women and girls occurred 
during the initial attacks in Darfur, and continue to occur against women 
and girls in refugee camps in and outside Darfur. In the totality of the 
circumstances, it appears that rape, which was sometimes accompanied 
by murder, was intended to destroy the ethnic tribes that inhabited Dar-
fur. This is only further evidence that genocide in fact occurred in Dar-
fur, and that the UN Commission was incorrect in its assessment as to the 
intent of the Sudanese Government and its militia. As the crisis in Dar-
fur in fact amounts to genocide, it is now time for the UN to mete out 
punishment for these blatant criminal acts. 
121. Askin, Sexual Violence In Decisions And Indictments Of The Yugoslav And Rwandan 
Tribunals: Current Status 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 97 (Jan. 1999); Simons, For First Time, Court Defines 
Rape as War Crime, NEW YORK TiMES, Jun. 28, 1996. 
122. Simons, For First Time, Court Defines Rape as War Crime, NEW YORK TiMES, Jun. 28, 
1996. 
123. Askin, Sexual Violence In Decisions And Indictments Of The Yugoslav And Rwandan 
Tribunals: Current Status 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 97 (1999). 
124. U.S. Dept. of State, Genocide Convention Now Extends to Systematic Rape, press release 
of the Embassy of the United States for Japan, (undated). 
125. Id. 
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B. VIOLATIONS OF OTHER IMPORTANT CONVENTIONS AND 
COVENANTS THAT DEMONSTRATE THAT INTERVENTION IN THE 
DARFUR CRISIS WAS WARRANTED 
While the following conventions do not have the same enforcement re-
quirements as the Genocide Convention, nevertheless, these conventions 
are important instruments in the international law of human rights. Fur-
ther, these documents lend credence to the argument that the situation in 
Darfur has given rise to a number of human rights violations, and that 
intervention was required to stop the killings, rapes and displacements, 
and is still needed to prevent further human rights violations. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights - "The International Bill of Rights" 
The international law of human rights includes numerous international 
agreements and other instruments, as well as an extensive body of prin-
ciples of customary law that seeks to establish minimum international 
standards for national human rights as international norms that states are 
required to respect and ensure. 126 Of course, the international law of 
human rights begins with the United Nations Charter, which has at its 
core the recognition of and respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples. 127 The three principal instruments of hu-
man rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) have collectively, acquired the designation "the International 
Bill of Rights." 128 
The Universal Declaration was adopted on December 10, 1948. Like the 
Charter of the United Nations itself, it was drafted as a result of Hitler's 
126. Damrosch, et aI., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 675-676 (4th ed. 2001). 
127. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter reads as follows: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. 
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social pro-
gress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and c. universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Article 56 of the Charter reads as follows: 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
128. Darnrosch, et aI., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (4th ed. 2001). 
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policies towards Jews and other atrocities that occurred during World 
War II. Today, more than half a century after its adoption, no state or 
government that has come into existence could question or express reser-
vations to the Universal Declaration, and it continues to be cited with 
unanimous approval or acquiescence in resolutions of international bod-
ies. 129 Though the Universal Declaration was not originally intended to 
be law, there has been an increased propensity to attribute a legal charac-
ter to many of its provisions, given its universal acceptance. 130 This has 
led many experts and scholars to argue that the provisions of the Univer-
sal Declaration in fact, have the force of customary law. 131 
In 1966, the Universal Declaration was bifurcated into the two distinct 
Covenants, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Both Covenants begin with the 
recognition of the inherent dignity of the human person, and that all 
members of the human family are entitled to the equal and inalienable 
rights of freedom, justice and peace in the world.132 But the two Cove-
nants then diverge. The ICCPR obligates states to respect and ensure the 
rights recognized by the Covenant for all persons subject to their juris-
diction, and to enact laws and adopt any other measures necessary to that 
end. 133 The ICESCR obligates states to recognize and achieve progres-
sively a number of rights,134 most notably, the right to adequate food, 
clothing and housing (Article 11), and the right to protection and assis-
tance to the family, mothers and children (Article 10). 
However, as worldwide events indicate, many nations have not strictly 
and faithfully adhered to the principles of the International Bill of Rights. 
Unlike the Universal Declaration, both of the Covenants were designed 
to transform the provisions of the Universal Declaration into binding 
treaties. Both Covenants have measures of enforcement by the estab-
lishment of Committees, I35 which requires states to report periodically to 
the Committees on measures that they have taken to adhere to the Cove-
nants. In addition, member states may consent or agree to the optional 
129. Id. at 593. 
130. Id. at 594. 
131. Id. 
132. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.unhchr.ch>. 
133. Damrosch, et aI., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 595-97 (4 th ed. 2001). 
134. Other rights include the right to work (Article 6); the right to just and favorable working 
conditions (Article 7); to social security (Article 9); to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health (Article 12); to education (Article 13); and to the right take part in cultural life, to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which a 
person is the author (Article 15). See, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<www.unhchr.ch>. 
135. The ICCPR has a Human Rights Committee, and the ICESCR has a Committee on Eco-
nomic, Cultural and Social Rights. 
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procedure of individual complaints being lodged against them by or on 
behalf of private individuals claiming to be victims of violation. 136 
Sudan is a party to both Covenants. As well documented herein, the 
Sudanese Government has committed innumerable gross violations of 
human rights. Under the enforcement mechanisms of both Covenants, 
the Government of Sudan could be held accountable for its violations, 
and subject to the obligations of adherence to the Covenants if either 
individuals or other states file complaints. However, because the number 
of complaints against the Sudanese Government for violations of both 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR (and other Human Rights Conventions) 
could number into the thousands, the most practical vehicle for handling 
such claims of violations, in addition to existing tribunals, could be the 
establishment of an international criminal tribunal, as discussed below. 
2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
December 1965 and entered into force January 1969. Its basic tenet is 
that, considering that the UN Charter is based on the principles of dignity 
and equality inherent in all human beings, all members should take steps 
to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion. 137 It further recognizes that every nation shall 
fully and faithfully observe the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 138 
While many nations have ratified the Convention, observance and en-
forcement of its tenets has been problematic. Numerous human rights 
violations based on race, sex, language and religion have occurred since 
the Convention's entry into force in 1969: the Vietnam war, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Rwanda, the apartheid in South Africa, torture and kidnappings 
in South America. The actions of the Sudanese Government and the 
government-sponsored militia against black Sudanese are a direct viola-
tion of the Convention. 
136. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.unhchr.ch>. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 593. 
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3. The Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(Women's Convention), is a special treaty dealing specifically with gen-
der-based discrimination. It was adopted in 1979 by the UN General 
Assembly, and entered into force two years later. However, the 
Women's Convention has attracted numerous reservations, reflecting 
deeply ingrained historical, cultural and religious attitudes. 139 
The aim of the Women's Convention is to eliminate all forms of dis-
crimination against women. Article 1 defines discrimination as "any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex."I40 While 
the overall goal of the Convention is to ensure the enjoyment of rights in 
every sphere on a basis of equality between men and women, the 
Women's Convention is nevertheless textually silent about violence 
against women, except in the Convention's reference to the trafficking of 
women. To remedy this, in 1992 the Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 19, on violence against women. The essence 
of Recommendation No. 19 is to point out that the Convention applies to 
violence against women perpetrated by public officials, and points out 
that discrimination is not restricted to acts by or on behalf of Govem-
ments.141 
Given the nature of the crimes committed against women as indicated 
herein, it is apparent that there have been gross violations of the Conven-
tion, in particular, Recommendation No. 19. However, as of 2000, only 
165 nations have fully ratified the Women's Convention, which makes 
its universal application as a standard on the treatment of women and the 
rights of women somewhat moot. The gruesome accounts of mass rape 
and mutilation of women in war and conflicts such as Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Rwanda and now Darfur cry out for a universal ratification and adoption 
of the Women's Convention. However, having attracted the greatest 
number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if 
139. Id. at 675-676. 
140. The full text of Article I of the Convention reads as follows: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the tenn 'discrimination against women' 
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction mad on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil 
or any other field. 
141. Damrosch, et aI., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 675-677 (4th ed. 2001). 
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not all the terms of the treaty,142 the Convention has almost no power to 
prevent such atrocities from continuing in the future. Given the number 
of reservations filed, it is not likely to be seriously applied any time soon. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted in November 
1989 and entered into force in January 1990. The Convention recognizes 
that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 
has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance, 
and that in order to achieve a full and harmonious development of a 
child, it is in the best interests of children to grow up in a family envi-
ronment. The Convention further recognizes that in order for the child to 
be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, a child should be 
brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, 
freedom and equality. 143 
The Convention further obligates states to respect and ensure the rights 
set forth in the Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without 
discrimination of any kind, as to the child or his or her parent or legal 
guardian on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or 
other status. 
Like many other Conventions drafted in the spirit of the International 
Bill of Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child have been egre-
giously violated over time, without much enforcement against states to 
curb their human rights violation practices against children. As with 
other Conventions and the International Bill of Rights discussed herein, 
the Government of Sudan is in gross violation of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child by creating the crisis in Darfur, and in continuing to 
perpetuate the crisis by forcing thousands of displaced women and chil-
dren to live in fear for their safety in makeshift homes in refugee camps. 
4. Convention on Refugees 
The United Nations Convention on Refugees was adopted 1951, in re-
sponse to the large number of Jewish people who had to leave Germany 
during World War II. The Convention on Refugees defines a refugee as 
"a person who has crossed an international border due to a well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
142. Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women, 85 A.I.LL. 281, 317 (1991). 
143. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.unhchr.ch>. 
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in a particular social group, or political opinion." It was the first interna-
tional agreement to guarantee protection to refugees. 144 
As noted above, the continued attacks against displaced Sudanese in 
Chad is in clear violation of the Convention. By the fact that displaced 
persons are now in a protected status, the Sudanese and Chad Govern-
ments are both under an obligation to protect refugees. While those dis-
placed persons still trapped in Darfur do not technically fall under the 
definition of refugee, nevertheless, it is arguable that the spirit of the 
Convention creates an obligation for governments not to engage in acts 
that effectively cause harm or allow harm to come to such displaced per-
sons. 
IV. SHOULD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE SUDAN BE CREATED? 
Given the number and types of human rights violations that have been 
committed in the conflict in the Sudan, an argument can be made that a 
special tribunal should be established to adjudicate the countless claims 
of victims of human rights violations. The Sudanese Government and its 
government-backed militia have violated a number of Human Rights 
Conventions, including the International Bill of Human Rights. 
The UN Security Council has the power to adopt a resolution creating 
such an ad hoc tribunal. It acted quickly when it established the ICTY in 
May 1993 and the ICTR in November 1994. Like Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur presents similar circumstances 
in which the Security Council can and should establish an international 
tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the Sudan. 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were created in response to the mass kill-
ings, widespread and systematic rape, "ethnic cleansing," and genocide 
being practiced in both the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda on a scale 
and of a ferocity not seen since the end of World War II. Like both 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council should 
consider that the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan and now, in 
Chad, constitute a threat to international peace and security. As such, the 
Security Council should establish another International Tribunal for the 
Sudan as a subsidiary judicial organ, with the purpose of halting and 
redressing previous and continuing violations. 
144. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees <www.unhchr.ch>. 
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The idea of the creation of a new international tribunal for the Sudan has 
been met with mixed support. The U.S., vehemently opposed to the 
creation of the International Criminal Court, in January 2005 lobbied UN 
Security Council members to create a new court for perpetrators of 
atrocities in Darfur. 145 However, the four European nations and most of 
the other nations on the 15-member Security Council oppose the creation 
of a new tribunal, and instead have (successfully) pushed for the utiliza-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to bring perpetrators to 
justice. 146 
Ironically, Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper, who worked to have rape 
deemed a crime of genocide during his tenure as a prosecutor in Rwanda, 
(and a Bush administration spokesman), has opposed use of the ICC, 
indicating that the U.S. did not wish to be a party to legitimizing the 
ICC. 147 However recently, the U.S. has had to acquiesce in the use of the 
ICC to prosecute crimes against humanity in Darfur. As of March 31, 
2005, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1593 [2005] referring 
the situation in Darfur since 2002 to the Special Prosecutor of the ICC. 148 
Not surprisingly, Khartoum has indicated that it will not cooperate in the 
prosecution of these cases. 149 
While this is not as potent as the creation of a special tribunal, for the 
victims of past and ongoing atrocities in Darfur, this may prove to be the 
best vehicle available to deal immediately with past human rights viola-
tions and the ongoing crisis. It is hoped that the ICC can bring justice for 
the crimes in the Sudan and Chad before countless others are killed or 
displaced. No tribunal, whether it is the ICC or a special tribunal for 
Sudan can change the fact that the world failed to intervene and stop the 
crisis. However, such a tribunal can intervene at long last to put an end 
to the suffering. 
145. Leopold, u.s. Lobbies United Nationsfor New Darfur Court, REUTERS, Jan, 28, 2005. 
146. ld. 
147. ld. 
148. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Security Council Refers Darfur 
Crimes to ICC (Apr. I, 2005) <www.irinnews.org>. 
149. Chaffee, Sudan Protests Role in Trying ICC War Criminals, Refoses Cooperation, (The 
Tharwa Project ed., Apr. 5-11,2005) <www.tharwaproject.com>. 
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